Forget about the “Corona Bond.” Should the ECB Purchase Eurozone Government Bond ETFs?


By Elham Saeidinezhad | In recent history, one of a few constants about the European Union (EU) is that it follows the U.S. footstep after any disaster. After the COVID-19 crisis, the Fed expanded the scope and duration of the Municipal Liquidity Facility (MLF) to ease the fiscal conditions of the states and the cities. The facility enables lending to states and municipalities to help manage cash flow stresses caused by the coronavirus pandemic. In a similar move, the ECB expanded its support for the virus-hit EU economies in response to the coronavirus pandemic. Initiatives such as Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP) allow the ECB to open the door to buy Greek sovereign bonds for the first time since the country’s sovereign debt crisis by announcing a waiver for its debt. 

There the similarity ends. While the market sentiment about the Fed’s support program for municipals is very positive, a few caveats in the ECB’s program have made the Union vulnerable to a market run. Fitch has just cut Italy’s credit rating to just above junk. The problem is that unlike the U.S., the European Union is only a monetary union, and it does not have a fiscal union. The investors’ prevailing view is that the ECB is not doing enough to support governments of southern Europe, such as Spain, Italy, and Greece, who are hardest hit by the virus. Anxieties about the Union’s fiscal stability are behind repeated calls for the European Union to issue common eurozone bonds or “corona bond.” Yet, the political case, especially from Northern European countries, is firmly against such plans. Further, despite the extreme financial needs of the Southern countries, the ECB is reluctant to lift its self-imposed limits not to buy more than a third of the eligible sovereign bonds of any single country and to purchase sovereign bonds in proportion to the weight of each country’s investment in its capital. This unwillingness is also a political choice rather than an economic necessity.

It is in that context that this piece proposes the ECB to include the Eurozone government bond ETF to its asset purchasing program. Purchasing government debts via the medium of the ETFs can provide the key to the thorny dilemma that is shaking the foundation of the European Union. It can also be the right step towards creating a borrowing system that would allow poorer EU nations to take out cheap loans with the more affluent members guaranteeing the funds would be returned. The unity of EU members faces a new, painful test with the coronavirus crisis. This is why the Italian Prime Minister Guiseppe Conte warned that if the bloc fails to stand up to it, the entire project might “lose its foundations.” The ECB’s decision to purchase Eurozone sovereign debt ETFs would provide an equal opportunity for all the EU countries to meet the COVID-19 excessive financial requirements at an acceptable price. Further, compared to the corona bond, it is less politically incorrect and more common amongst the central bankers, including those at the Fed and the Bank of Japan.

In the index fund ecosystem, the ETFs are more liquid and easier to trade than the basket of underlying bonds. What lies behind this “liquidity transformation” is the different equilibrium structure and the efficiency properties in markets for these two asset classes. In other words, the dealers make markets for these assets under various market conditions. In the market for sovereign bonds, the debt that is issued by governments, especially countries with lower credit ratings, do not trade very much. So, the dealers expect to establish long positions in these bonds. Such positions expose them to the counterparty risk and the high cost of holding inventories. Higher price risk and funding costs are correlated with an increase in spreads for dealers. Higher bid-ask spreads, in turn, makes trading of sovereign debt securities, especially those issued by countries such as Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece, more expensive and less attractive.

On the contrary, the ETFs, including the Eurozone government bond ETFs, are considerably more tradable than the underlying bonds for at least two reasons. First, the ETF functions as the “price discovery” vehicle because this is where investors choose to transact. The economists call the ETF a price discovery vehicle since it reveals the prices that best match the buyers with the sellers. At these prices, the buying and selling quantities are just in balance, and the dealers’ profitability is maximized. According to Treynor Model, these “market prices” are the closest thing to the “fundamental value” as they balance the supply and demand. Such an equilibrium structure has implications for the dealers. The make markers in the ETFs are more likely to have a “matched book,” which means that their liabilities are the same as their assets and are hedged against the price risk. The instruments that are traded under such efficiency properties, including the ETFs, enjoy a high level of market liquidity.

Second, traders, such as asset managers, who want to sell the ETF, would not need to be worried about the underlying illiquid bonds. Long before investors require to acquire these bonds, the sponsor of the ETF, known as “authorized participants” will be buying the securities that the ETF wants to hold. Traditionally, authorized participants are large banks. They earn bid-ask spreads by providing market liquidity for these underlying securities in the secondary market or service fees collected from clients yearning to execute primary trades. Providing this service is not risk-free. Mehrling makes clear that the problem is that supporting markets in this way requires the ability to expand banks’ balance sheets on both sides, buying the unwanted assets and funding that purchase with borrowed money. The strength of banks to do that on their account is now severely limited. Despite such balance sheet constraints, by acting as “dealers of near last resort,” banks provide an additional line of defense in the risk management system of the asset managers. Banks make it less likely for the investors to end up purchasing the illiquid underlying assets.

That the alchemists have created another accident in waiting has been a fear of bond market mavens and regulators for several years. Yet, in the era of COVID-19, the alchemy of the ETF liquidity could dampen the crisis in making by boosting virus-hit countries’ financial capacity. Rising debt across Europe due to the COVID-19 crisis could imperil the sustainability of public finances. This makes Treasury bonds issued by countries such as Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Italy less tradable. Such uncertainty would increase the funding costs of external bond issuance by sovereigns. The ECB’s attempt to purchase Eurozone government bonds ETFs could partially resolve such funding problems during the crisis. Further, such operations are less risky than buying the underlying assets.

Some might argue the ETFs create an illusion of liquidity and expose the affluent members of the ECB to an unacceptably high level of defaults by the weakest members. Yet, at least two “real” elements, namely the price discovery process and the existence of authorized participants who act as the dealers of the near last resort, allows the ETFs to conduct liquidity transformation and become less risky than the underlying bonds. Passive investing sometimes is called as “worse than Marxism.” The argument is that at least communists tried to allocate resources efficiently, while index funds just blindly invest according to an arbitrary benchmark’s formula. Yet, devouring capitalism might be the most efficient way for the ECB to circumvent political obstacles and save European capitalism from itself.


Elham Saeidinezhad is lecturer in Economics at UCLA. Before joining the Economics Department at UCLA, she was a research economist in International Finance and Macroeconomics research group at Milken Institute, Santa Monica, where she investigated the post-crisis structural changes in the capital market as a result of macroprudential regulations. Before that, she was a postdoctoral fellow at INET, working closely with Prof. Perry Mehrling and studying his “Money View”.  Elham obtained her Ph.D. from the University of Sheffield, UK, in empirical Macroeconomics in 2013. You may contact Elham via the Young Scholars Directory

Greece has a Private Debt Crisis and We Can Blame the Troika

The Greek public debt debacle and the bailout received by the government from the European Central Bank (ECB), the European Commission (EC), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – referred to collectively as the “troika” – has been making headlines for years. However, very little attention has been paid to the debt crisis in the Greek private sector. An alarmingly high portion of private sector borrowers is behind on their debt payments, and the Greek banking system currently has one of the highest ratios of delinquent loans in the European Union.

This collapse of debt prepayments is a direct result the policies imposed by the Troika and threatens the future of Greek economic growth. After the Greek government required financial assistance from international creditors, it was forced to introduce draconic austerity measures to repay its debt. Cutbacks to state services, collapses in incomes, and an increasingly unstable economic environment contracted spending, therefore, eliminating future cash flows that private entities expected to use to repay their debt. The result has been a spiral of collapsing demand and shrinking growth.   

Greece’s accession to the Eurozone was followed by a largely ignored, rapid, and unsustainable build-up in private sector debt. Once the Greek government was forced to impose severe austerity measures and the economy collapsed, the private debt crisis followed. Now, the large ratio of delinquent loans held by Greek banks is adding to the factors hampering economic growth. For Greece to recover, its private debt problems need to urgently be addressed with an approach that offers relief to both borrowers and lenders.

 

This article was originally published by the Private Debt Project. Read the entire article here.

 

The full article highlights how the mismanagement of the Greek sovereign debt problems triggered the current private debt crisis. We show the rapid growth in private debt, document the macroeconomic context that pushed to Greece into a depression, and explain how these factors created a private debt crisis. Then, we discuss some of the existing proposals for addressing a large number of loan delinquencies and their limitations, and finally, propose other approaches to tackle this pressing problem.

Community Currencies: A Ray of Light in the Rust Belt

In times of severe recession, cash can be hard to come by. To somewhat maintain their standard of living and avoid being further driven into poverty, some communities developed their own alternative currencies. These community currencies are parallel systems of exchange. They are growing in popularity in countries such as Greece, which is currently battling the failures of modern capitalism, and could also be implemented in parts of the United States. The Rust Belt states could benefit from the implementation of similar initiatives. We take a quick look at how:

Community Currencies in Europe: Volos

The existence of community currencies as parallel monetary systems is justified by ecological economics, a branch of research that focusses on the interdependence of human economics with the natural environment. The aim is to promote sustainable development through the revival of vital aspects of the socio-economic fabric that have taken a backseat with the rise of capitalism: rebuilding social capital, replacing material consumption and bringing back value to labor to mean more than just as a mere factor of production. In short, it brings the market and its dynamics back to the grassroots level where it is simply an arena for the facilitation of provisioning survival rather than primarily for capital gains and growth.

The way community currencies work is best explained through a real-life example. Take, for instance, the story of Volos, a fishing village located in central Greece. Volos has experienced hard times since the Greek debt crisis began several years ago. Now, barter forms the basis of their system of exchange. The underlying currency is a local alternative unit of account called the TEM.

The TEM acts as a temporary IOU that allows for a more immediate exchange of goods and services the villagers in Volos require to maintain their daily living standards. People can exchange ironing service for language lessons, or potatoes for fish, and so on. The exchanges are supported by an online platform where ads for community members’ needs are posted. The system has come into existence to resolve villagers’ limited access to cash. It’s helped to maintain demand and prevent an economic standstill.


Community Currencies in the US: Time Banks

The most popular form of community currency initiated in the US has been the Time Banking system. Time banks were originally set up to create a social support system within neighborhoods, allowing group members to trade goods and services without money. Each hour of community work is exchanged at the bank for a unit of time-based local credit that can be redeemed for other goods and services. In this way, the labor is valued based on time, not market prices.

The positive impact Time Banking leaves on a community extends well beyond just the ability for low-income groups to access goods and services that might otherwise be unaffordable. It also helps alleviate to some extent the systemic problems of inequality that are often not factored into its cost. Although such systems have sprouted around the United States, they have gained much recognition. Participation rates at Time Banks have remained very low, and it remains unclear why.


Can Community Currencies be used more extensively?

So if Community Currencies can improve economic well-being among low-income groups, why is it not more popular? First, the systems have not been studied sufficiently. A lack of research on Community Currencies and their benefits has limited our understanding of their potential, and their growth in popularity.

Second, there are inherent geographic constraints that community currencies have yet to overcome. Under the current format, payment in community currencies is only accepted within small areas. As such, they can only be used for the exchange of goods and services that were arbitrarily made available within those areas. In order to make the system more successful, the geographic reach should be extended, allowing for more goods and services to be taken up in the system.

State intervention could make this happen. A local government could offer tax incentives to private healthcare facilities within the geographic sector of the community currency. In exchange, the health-care facility would accept payment from uninsured low-income clients in the alternative currency. If more necessary goods and services can be included in the range of products made available there would be more sustainable.

Therefore, Community Currencies require the strong and continued support from their local government to remain successful. In Greece, a first step was made several years ago, when parliament passed a law that allowed barter groups to be classified as non-profit organizations. The local government in Volos was appreciative of the change, given that it allows for some semblance of normal everyday life to continue in a time of austerity.

One reason why government might be reluctant to endorse more of these programs is that it challenges the conventional payment system. However, a community currency as a limited IOU need not pose a threat and can be of significant help in keeping up demand. This allows for more stable incomes for a larger proportion of people in the economy and the capacity to generate more tax revenues in the long run. This is especially relevant in an economic environment that is highly dependent on bank credit to remain functional.

As such, the potential of community currencies should not go unrecognized. Governments should step in to help broaden the system, and allow for their participants to reap the full benefits. This way, community currencies can be an invaluable source of demand in times of crisis.

The Case for Community Currencies in the ‘Rust Belt’

The Rust Belt comprises the set of states bordering the Great Lakes, which were once famous for being the heart of manufacturing and industry in the US. This changed with the economic decline brought about by the recessions of the late 1970’s and early 80’s, which continued to worsen with the further decline of US manufacturing.

Entire towns and villages in this region have disappeared along with the core industry that once sustained them. Some towns were able to salvage their economies by capitalizing on tourism or education, but this is not a strategy that can be extended to the entire region. States such as Michigan and Ohio also cope with an aging population, male joblessness, and rising opiate addiction. There is a dire need for the region’s underprivileged to become active and positive contributors to society again.

If aided by the state, community currencies could be the starting point for the Rust Belt states to begin their journey back to being the productive contributors to the US economy that they once were. Just like in Volos, it could boost economic activity and allow members to contribute to the rebuilding of their community.

The economic benefits of State regulated Community Currencies could include incentives for sharing skill sets to allow more unskilled workers to become employed. There would be less dependence on welfare as the marginalized begin to seek more socially and individually meaningful ways of sustaining themselves. This would also offer a much-needed boost to local economies that would be limited to purchasing goods and services within the community

The success of such initiatives often depends on communities coming together and organizing to collectively achieve economic wellbeing, setting aside social and class differences. The effective implementation of community currencies in places like Volos was ultimately determined by the way such systems are maintained and nurtured by the entire community under the appropriate community leadership. Whether such social dynamics also exist to the required extent in the communities of the Rust Belt is still something to be discovered. If so, then there may well be a light on the horizon to guide them out from under the burden of years of poverty.

Written by Athulya Gopi
Athulya is originally Indian, born and brought up in the United Arab Emirates. She joined the Levy Masters Program in 2016 after leading a successful career in credit insurance over the last 8 years. She has a few more years of worldly wisdom than her fellow classmates! The choice to swap her role as the head of commercial underwriting with that of a full-time student came after being inspired to see how Economics works in the real world.

Germany Does Have Unfair Trade Advantages

In one of Donald Trump’s rants, he claimed the reason why there are so many German cars in the U.S. is that their automakers do not behave fairly. The German economy’s prompt response was that “the U.S. just needs to build better cars.” However, this time, probably without even realizing it, Donald Trump was on to something – Germany’s currency setup does give it unfair trade advantages.

While China is commonly accused of currency manipulation to provide cheap exports, the IMF has recently decided the renminbi (RMB) is no longer undervalued and added it in its reserve currency basket, along with other major currencies. However, an IMF analysis of Germany’s currency found “an undervaluation of 5-15 percent” for the Euro in the case of Germany. Thus for Germany, the Euro has a significantly lower value than a solely German currency would have.

Since the Euro was introduced, Germany has become an export powerhouse. This is not because after 2000 the quality of German goods has improved, but rather because as a member of the Eurozone, Germany had the opportunity to boost its exports with policies that allowed it to maintain an undervalued currency.

Germany and France are the largest Eurozone economies. Prior to joining the Eurozone, both countries had modest trade surpluses.

In the above figure we can see how following the implementation of the Euro, the trade balances of Germany and France completely diverged. The French moved to having a persistent trade deficit (importing more than they export), while Germany’s surplus exploded (exporting much more than they import). After a brief decline in the surplus in the immediate aftermath of the crisis, it is now again on the rise.

In the early 2000s Germany undertook several national policies to artificially hold wages down. These measures were seen as a success for Germany globally. By being part of the Eurozone and holding down wages, the Germans could export at extremely competitive prices globally. Had they not been part of the Eurozone, their currency would have appreciated, and they would not have the same advantages.

In the aftermath of the European debt crisis, Germany took a tough stance on struggling debtor countries. Under German leadership, the European Commission imposed draconic austerity measures on countries such as Greece to punish them for spending irresponsibly. Spearheaded by Germany, The EU (along with the IMF) offered a bailout to Greece so that it could pay the German and French banks it owed money to.

This bailout came with strict conditions for the Greek government that was forced to impose harsh austerity. The promise was that if the government cut its spending, the increased market confidence would help the economy recover. As a member of the Eurozone, Greece had very limited monetary policy tools it could use. Currency devaluation was no longer an option, the country was stuck with a currency that was too strong for its economy.

Meanwhile Germany prospered and enjoyed the perks of an undervalued currency. Being able to supply German goods at relatively low prices, Germany’s exports flourished. At the same time, Greeks, and other countries at the periphery of the union, were only left with the choice to face a strong internal devaluation, which meant letting unemployment explode and wages collapse until they become attractive destinations for investment.

Germany consistently broke the rules of the currency area, without ever being punished. When it first broke the deficit limits agreed upon by Eurozone members in 2003, the European Commission turned a blind eye. Germany is often considered to have set an example for other EU nations by practicing sound finance, and having a growing, healthy economy.

Greece, on the other hand is blamed for spending too much on social services, and many of its problems are blamed on being a welfare state. When you compare the actual numbers, however, Greece’s average social spending is much less than that of Germany. Between 1998 and 2005, Greece spent an average of 19 percent of GDP, while Germany spent as much as 26 percent.

To address these vast differences in the trade patterns of the EU nations, the European Commission introduced the so-called “six-pack” in 2011. These regulations introduced procedures to address “Macroeconomic Imbalances.” However, as found in the Commission’s country report “Germany has made limited progress in addressing the 2014 country-specific recommendations.”

Germany’s trade competitiveness comes at the price of making other members of the Eurozone less competitive. This is something that Germany needs to be aware of when responding to the problems other economies are facing. Currently Germany is demanding punishments for countries whose have few policy tools available to stimulate growth as Eurozone members.

However, Germany should keep in mind that the Euro is preventing the currency adjustments that would take away its trade competitiveness. Without a struggling EU periphery, there wouldn’t be a flourishing Germany.

Why is Austerity Still Being Prescribed?

After years of strict austerity and a worsening crisis, the Greek economy is still in a slump.

However, Eurozone officials continue to prescribe the medicine of austerity.  The diagnosis for the Greek crisis was the fiscal profligacy of its government, and thus to restore the health of its economy, Greece simply had to slash its spending. As with any prescription, some short-term side effects were expected. However, year after year the side effects have gotten worse, with unemployment and poverty at all-time highs and demand at all-time lows. Meanwhile, the economy, in a deepening recession, is far from being cured. To make matters worse, despite the reduced fiscal deficits, the shrinking economy means the debt-to-GDP ratio is nevertheless growing.

In the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, Europe embraced austerity as the best medicine to cure its damaged economies. Conservative economists and leading institutions such as the European Central Bank (ECB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) promoted the concept of austerity. The EU imposed spending cuts on all its members. It is using the dire situation of Greece as a warning against the accumulation of more debt. A  council of Eurozone ministers, spearheaded by Germany, aggressively pushed for more austerity. Meanwhile, despite complying with the prescribed “medicine,” the health of the Greek economy grew increasingly worse…

However, the theoretical justification behind austerity is questionable. The fear of government deficits was backed by studies such as “Growth in a time of debt” by Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff. This paper, published in 2010 predicted catastrophic economic consequences for any country surpassing a debt-to-GDP ratio of more than 90%. Backed by this research, high-ranking European officials made their case to abruptly cut government spending.  

While Reinhart and Rogoff’s study created a buzz amongst conservative politicians when it was published. However, it was mostly ignored by the same politicians when it was discredited.  In 2013, it was shown that the spreadsheet used for the calculations in the study was laden with mistakes. Its results were gravely exaggerated. After the errors were fixed, some correlation between government debt and slow growth remained but not one sufficient to establish causation. It is plausible to assume that slow growth is the cause of the increase in government debt. A summary of this controversy can be found.

In the early 2000s, the Greek government began to accumulate massive amounts of debt. By 2009, the government debt had reached almost 135% of GDP. The government quickly enacted extreme spending cuts. So, it is resulting in a  ratio decrease that lasted until 2011. However, the Greek economy, in the midst of a deep recession. It did not respond very well to these cuts which came coupled with the added bonus of tax hikes. Domestic demand collapsed and unemployment soared. Moreover, overall confidence in the economy faded. Greek GDP fell, and the debt-to-GDP ratio exploded. Currently, that ratio is at about 180% of GDP and is projected to reach 200% by 2020. (OECD) The Greek economy is on a downward spiral in which imposed spending cuts reduce incomes, reduce spending, and further contract the economy, and limit its ability to repay its debts.

Despite the academic case for austerity weakening, the Greek parliament is forced to impose even deeper spending cuts to receive more funds from European institutions. Without additional loans, Greece would be unable to make the payments on its previous debt. However, most of the bailout money received by Greece has gone on payments for maturing loans.

The Greek sovereign debt has turned into a ponzi scheme. New loans are obtained to make interest payments on older ones, while the principals rise and the economy shrinks. The IMF, initially a main proponent of austerity, has recently come out in favor of restructuring Greece’s debt and allowing for some economic stimulus. It appears that EU officials are finally willing to listen, at least in respect, to debt restructuring. Last week, the council of Eurozone ministers agreed to discuss some debt relief. However, this comes with the same condition attached: more and even harsher austerity.

For a sick economy such as Greece, it is difficult to see how even aggressive spending cuts could nurse it back to health.  After austerity has failed year after year in reducing Greek debt and revitalizing its economy, it is time to try a different medicine. Under EU agreements, countries are required to be fiscally conservative. Moreover, EU officials, under German direction, have refused to change their stance on weakening the austerity imposed on Greece. Greece’s suffering has become an example of what happens when those rules are broken.

However, if the EU wants Greece to repay its debt and recover, it needs to stop punishing it and give it room for growth. The European officials who continue to force austerity on Greece should take a step back and realize that the best way to reduce the Greek debt-to-GDP ratio and make it sustainable, is to allow for its economy to grow. Clearly, austerity measures have not brought about the desired growth and health. Greece needs a different prescription. One that would indeed stimulate its economy and not keep it locked in an ICU.

Written by Lara Merling
Illustrations by Heske van Doornen