Debt Archives – Page 2 of 3

Taxes and Turmoil in Lebanese Politics

A series of protests have begun to rock Lebanon as of mid-March 2017. Protesters are taking to the streets to denounce the Lebanese government’s plan to introduce or increase 22 new taxes on citizens, most notably increasing the VAT tax from 10-11%, as well as various other taxes on food, drink, public notary services, and other categories that stand to impact daily purchases in the country. These measures will further reduce spending power of average Lebanese citizens during a time period when poverty has already risen by 66%(!) in the past 6 years, when around 30% of the population lives below the poverty line, when 9% of the Lebanese population lives on less than $1 per day, and when Syrian refugees continue to pour into Lebanon by the millions, further exacerbating Lebanese economic woes. Furthermore, Lebanon is the 3rd most unequal country on this planet in terms of wealth inequality, and this inequality implies that these new tax measures will primarily impact those who are already struggling to survive, let alone maintain a decent standard of living. In fact, these newly proposed taxes will be what economists call a “regressive tax,” since they will consume a bigger portion of the poor’s income compared to the rich.

The biggest complaint, rightfully so, of the protesters is that Lebanese politicians, with their entrenched system of confessionalism and nepotism, have stolen from public funds to aggrandize their own wealth, and have left the average Lebanese citizen struggling to survive off of the crumbs tossed to them. This rampant corruption, culture of excess, and paralysis of state oversight has contributed to a debt-to-GDP ratio of 140%, one of the highest in the world. Despite such mounting debt, the Lebanese government has little show for it in terms of providing services to the public.

For example, the Lebanese government cuts off electricity for several hours a day throughout the country— sometimes as much as 40-50% of the day, and claims that there are simply no public funds available to provide electricity for a full 24 hours. This is where the new tax proposal comes in; the government maintains that their hands are simply tied, and that these painful measures are needed to make a dent in paying off the public debt. However, when we examine the issue of public debt from the perspective of Modern Money Theory (MMT), we find that this idea is based on ignorance of how taxes and spending work at the public level.

MMT asserts that any sovereign government is capable of printing its own money into existence to pay for anything that it wishes to, from public healthcare to defense to infrastructure, or any other government-funded project. Because the government can create money out of nothing by simply printing it, or electronically transferring it to bank accounts, this by definition removes the necessity to collect taxes as a form of revenue to pay for things. The Lebanese government, for example, could have enough money to pay for electricity 24 hours a day if it simply created money to pay for it by electronically transferring the sum to the bank accounts to pay electricity companies. All of this can be done without ensuring that there is an equal amount of taxes flowing into the government, because the government does not use these taxes to pay for things. It pays for things by creating money out of nothing.

With this understanding, we can then reverse the causal relationship between taxes and public spending: taxes do not fund public spending. Rather, public spending creates the money by which citizens can conduct economic activity, including paying taxes. This is not an example of the classic “chicken vs. egg” conundrum. In this case, we can definitely say which side came first, for logical reasons. Citizens would simply not be able to pay taxes unless they had the money to pay for them in the first place, which in turn must be created by the government and released into the economy through public spending.

This implies that the government’s debt and deficit, as a matter of principle, does not matter to the public sector in the same way that a debt would matter to a household or firm. Government can always print more money in order to pay for things, including interest on debts. If a household tried to create its own play money and offer it to the credit card company at the end of the month, it would be rightfully ridiculed. However, because the government’s currency is universally recognized as bestowing the holder with value, it is accepted anywhere, and for “all debts, public and private.” In effect, it is the sovereignty of the state, and the credibility of their power to meet contractual financial obligations, that gives the money its value.

So, what then is the purpose of taxes, if they are not used to fund government spending? Primarily, taxes are a way of the government asserting sovereignty over its citizens. By denominating the taxes levied on citizens in the currency that they print, the government ensures that there will always be a widespread demand for its currency that people need to obtain to pay taxes. This ability to create money out of nothing and to generate widespread demand for it is a powerful component of state sovereignty, and, as other articles attest, the modern state as we know it would not even exist today without this power.

Taxes also serve another important economic function: they limit how much money a person can spend (purchasing power). When the government is worried about inflation (rising prices throughout society) brought about by rapid economic growth, for example, increasing taxes would be one way of decreasing spending in the entire economy, thus counteracting the threat of inflation. However, what does this mean for a country like Lebanon with a sizable percentage of its population living under the poverty line, and where the problem is too little spending and economic growth, not too much?

If Lebanese citizens have to pay increasingly higher taxes on daily necessities, their purchasing power will shrink. As their purchasing power and consumption declines, businesses will suffer. Investment and employment rates would likely decline, and poverty would increase. This increase in poverty would translate into citizens having even less money to contribute to taxes, since they would be consuming less and would have a smaller income. In such a situation, instead of these new tax measures decreasing the government debt, it is conceivable that they would actually do the exact opposite by increasing it, due to a decline in consumption and income, which are two of the biggest sources of taxes for the Lebanese government.

To conclude, it is time to admit the problems facing Lebanon are much more complex and fundamental than any new tax proposals would ever fix. Taxes do not create revenue for government spending, and in fact, new taxes in the country would even threaten to propel the already unacceptably high poverty line in the country even higher, as incomes and purchasing power are eroded. There is no reason to believe that the government debt even needs to be paid off in the first place, since government can never run out of money to pay for things, including debt servicing payments. Rather, the most fundamental problem in Lebanon is a political system characterized by diversionary religious sectarianism, and a culture of corruption and disdain for the masses that have allowed the Lebanese politicians to usurp public funds for personal gain, all while keeping a stranglehold on the people’s aspirations for freedom and dignity for decades.

Written by Stephanie Attar
Stephanie is part of the third group of students studying at the Levy Institute. Prior to coming to the Levy, she completed a masters degree in political science, with a concentration in political philosophy. Her research always incorporates Marxian dialectical materialism in order to analyze the interconnected nature between the state and the economy. She is also interested in the Arab world, global inequalities engendered by capitalism-imperialism, and radical solutions to advance the interests of humanity.

The Shortage of Money: A Fallacious Problem

Whether they are implemented in Latin America (1970-90s), in the UK (under Thatcher) or in Greece (since 2012), austerity measures are all justified by the fact that “there is not enough money.” People are told that “there is no alternative,” and that the state needs to implement structural adjustment programs—usually including across-the-board spending cuts—to restore investors’ confidence and to hope for a better future.

What if this shortage of money could be overcome? What if this problem was ultimately the wrong one? What if we could have money for everything we needed?

In her latest book, The Production of Money: how to break the power of Bankers, Ann Pettifor argues that:

YES the society can afford everything that it needs,
YES we are able to ensure enough money for education, healthcare, sustainable development and the well-being of our communities,
YES we can discard money shortage, contrary to the human or physical (land and resources) ones.

However, one condition needs to be fulfilled: our monetary system should be well-regulated and managed.

To understand how and why, Ann Pettifor takes us back to basics. She starts by defining money as a “social construct based primarily and ultimately on trust”. One of the reasons why we use money in the first place is because we know that others will accept it in the future; it is the means “not for which we use to exchange goods and services, but by which we undertake this exchange” (Law). Your 100-dollar bill would be worthless if others didn’t accept it. The value of money depends on the “acceptance” of money, i.e. on the trust you and others have in money.

Contrary to popular belief, 95% of (broad) money (i.e. cash and coins + bank deposits) is created by private banks and not by the central bank. When a bank makes a loan to a firm, it creates simultaneously a deposit account from which the firm withdraws the loan. Money is therefore created “out of thin air” when the account of the borrower is credited—i.e. when loans are made. This has two implications:

When money is created, so is debt. This debt needs to be repaid. Ann Pettifor uses the example of a credit card which allows you to purchase goods and services today. The spending (= purchasing power) on a credit card “is created out of thin air”. You will ultimately need to pay back the amount spent plus a pre-agreed interest rate. Money is therefore a promise of a future productive value.
The money supply depends on private borrowers and their demand for loans. Central banks influence (but do not control) the money supply by increasing or decreasing the cost of borrowing with their policy interest rate. Money creation is therefore a bottom-up process rather than a top-down one.

Does this mean that we should create as much money as people want loans? Of course not. According to Ann Pettifor, there are constraints that make unlimited borrowing impossible: inflation (and deflation). Indeed, if money is not channeled toward productive purposes, the claim associated to it might not be reimbursed. In other words, the promise of a future productive value might not be fulfilled. When there is too much money “chasing too few goods and services”, reflecting over-confidence in the economy, it results in inflation, eroding the value of assets (such as pensions). Similarly, when there is not enough borrowing (either because borrowers need to repay their debts, as it has been the case in Japan and the US right after the last recession, or because the cost of borrowing is effectively too high), reflecting distrust in the ability to repay debt, deflation steps in.

Therefore, as money can be created “out of thin air”, there is no reason to have a shortage of money as long as it is channeled towards productive purposes. An unlimited amount of money can be created for projects that will ultimately result in the production of value, which will allow the repayment of debt. However, the author does not define what “value” or “productive purposes” are, which in my opinion is the main drawback of the book.

Although Pettifor does give some hints by opposing “productive purposes” to “speculative” ones and by associating “value” to the notion of “income, employment and sustainability”, her approach is rather imprecise and in this sense disappointing. To her credit, defining value is a difficult task, especially if we want to define what is valuable to the society as a whole. Pinning down the definition of value is, in my opinion, ultimately a political debate. If one considers that democracies reflect “collective preferences”, it can be said that societies decide through elections on what is most valuable to them at a given point in time.

Unfortunately, the current monetary system does neither enable nor guarantee that money and credit are used for productive purposes. It is characterized by “easy” and “dear” money; the former refers to unregulated and easy access to borrowing, while the latter conveys the idea of expensive borrowing, i.e. with loans charged at high interest rate. The issue with this system is that (1) with unregulated borrowing, money will be used for unproductive purposes, (2) with high interests, debtors will meet difficulties reimbursing their loans.

Such a system is harmful to society. In the words of Ann Pettifor:

“If rates of interest are too high, debtors have to raise the funds of debt repayment by increasing rates of profits, and by the further extraction of value. These pressures to increase income at exponential rates for the repayment of debt implies that both labor and the land (defined broadly) must be exploited at ever-rising rates. Those who labor by hand or brain work harder and longer to repay rising, real levels of mortgage or credit card debt. It is no accident therefore that the deregulation of finance led to the deregulation of working hours.”

A sound financial and monetary system would precisely have opposite features, with “tight but cheap credit” (Keynes), in which loans are regulated but cheap. “Tight credit” would ensure the soundness and creditworthiness of loans, while “cheap credit”, secures the affordability and thus the repayment of loans.

Hence, Ann Pettifor makes a remarkable argument by providing an in-depth but accessible insight into the workings of the monetary system and the debates surrounding it. Both economists and non-economists should give it a read.

It is indeed quite astonishing that money, ever-present in our lives, is so poorly understood; even by many economic experts themselves. According to Ann Pettifor, this incomprehension stems from the deliberate efforts of the financial sector to “obscure its activities” in order to maintain its omnipotence. The Production of Money aims at addressing this “crisis of ignorance” by providing an intelligible and comprehensive overview of money in the hope of empowering people against finance’s grip over society.

By Céline Tcheng
Disclaimer: views are my own.

About the Author

Céline grew up between Paris, China and Singapore. After graduating in a Master’s degree in Economics and Public Policy, she now works for a public policy institution in France. In her free time, she coordinates INET (Institute for New Economic Thinking) YSI (Young Scholars Initiative)’s Financial Stability Working Group and performs with her dance crew “Slash Art”. Her main interests are: macroprudential policy, financial stability, monetary policy. Follow her on Twitter: @celine_tcheng

A Green Job Program Will Help Workers, the Economy, and the Planet

There’s been much talk about Trump’s plan for jobs and infrastructure that entails over one trillion dollars in new spending (without tax increases) and promises to employ thousands of American workers. Because it looks like this would require significant deficit spending, it has drawn stiff criticism: even Trump’s the own conservative supporters have expressed concern.

Among advocates of Keynesian spending and Modern Money Theory (MMT), however, some precautionary excitement can be observed. Their perspective is different because they are unafraid of a government deficit, and in favor of direct job creation. They understand that deficit-spending is not inherently bad, and that the US government will never have to default on its debt. When the economy is not at full employment, increasing the deficit would actually be helpful, not harmful.

A fiscal stimulus aimed at reducing unemployment is timely and necessary. Despite the confidence expressed by the Fed about the latest employment numbers, the situation for those who are jobless is not looking good. One of the reasons for the latest rate hike by the Fed was their positive outlook on unemployment numbers. Chairman Yellen has gone as far as saying that (at 4.6% unemployment rate) we are close to full employment and fiscal stimulus is not necessary to reach that goal.

However, the low official joblessness rate hides the fact that an increasing number of Americans have left the labor force altogether; for example there are currently over 5 million Americans who are not in the labor force but have reported that they want a job. This is where a Job Guarantee program could come in handy. In short, the government would act as an Employer of Last Resort, effectively guaranteeing a job to all of those willing and able to work.

And if Trump uses the deficit-spending towards jobs in infrastructure, it might result in something that resembles the job guarantee policy that America needs**. I argue, however, that the financial feasibility should not be the only criterium for a successful implementation of the job-guarantee. It also has to be sustainable. If we’re going to be at full employment, we have to do it in a way the planet can handle.

The current structure of the economy relies too heavily on fossil fuels, wasteful production methods and non-renewable resources. Unless we change this, sustaining full-employment would result in increasing production, consumption, and waste. My favorite Keynes’ quote is that “In the long run we are all dead.” If we’re talking about a long run of increasing pollution, he will surely be right. As we know, too much of a good thing can be a bad thing. This applies to jobs too. Unless they are green jobs, too many jobs will be bring us environmental destruction.

The issue of the environmental sustainability of a Job Guarantee program has been on my mind since I first heard of the proposal. Mathew Forstater’s Green Jobs proposal was inspirational to my work. In my Master’s thesis, I tweak its existing framework to target environmentally sustainable outcomes. I find that we can transform the Job Guarantee program to ensure its sustainability without increasing its cost. Here’s how:

I set up the program in a way that promotes social enterprise and community development, following the work of Pavlina Tcherneva et al. With the help of social entrepreneurs, NGOs, and Nonprofit Organizations, local communities should decide what projects will be undertaken. For example, communities along the Hudson river could support a program where workers dealt with invasive species such as the zebra mussel and water chestnut. Other localities could handle neighborhood farming, recycling centers, flood containment structures, bike paths, etc.. It’s been found that if the community is involved in determining what projects are taken on, participation levels are higher.

A more detailed account of my proposal and calculations is available upon request, but this is the gist of it: I used an Input-Output model to establish what would be the cost of employing the official U-3 unemployed population into “green” Job Guarantee jobs. That framework accounts for indirect job creation related to the proposal, but not induced employment. What I find is that the US government can, under conservative assumptions, employ all of those who are officially unemployed for around 1.1% of GDP while paying them a $15hr wage. That is about 17% of the annual military budget. The Green Job Guarantee program is projected to cost just under 200 Billion dollars per year in order to ensure employment for 7.8 million people.

As the world economy quickly transitions into a more sustainable state, a shift in the productive structure will occur, rendering some current occupations useless. Workers who are employed in areas like fossil fuel energy generation (the fabled coal workers of the American Midwest for example) will be left without a job and unlikely to find a new one right away. There is no way to predict how quickly this transition will occur: it could be a gradual–albeit fast–process if led by government initiative, a slower and insufficient movement if guided by profit motives, or even a sudden transition caused by widespread popular response to natural disasters.

Given current trends it is safe to assume that the transition to a renewable energy generation and a sustainable economy will occur before the fossil reserves are depleted. Just as the stone age ended before we ran out of stone, the “oil-age” will end before we run out of oil. As such, fossil fuel workers (and those who depend on their consumption) are at risk of losing their jobs in the near future. A Job Guarantee program would allow those workers to not only find employment readily, but also to acquire the on-the-job skills that will allow them an easier transition into the Green economy.

So as we continue to criticize and investigate the means of job-creation proposed by the President-Elect, let’s look beyond the government deficit, and consider the planet, too. Whether you’re afraid of government debt or not, you should be concerned with the destruction of the earth. If we are going to have a public program that aims a generating new jobs and bringing people back into the workforce, then that program should be a Job Guarantee. But, if we’re going to guarantee jobs, the will have to be green. And we have all the tools we need to make that happen.
*Interested in some good work on how to build a sustainable economy? Check out the publications from PERI and the Binzagr Institute for Sustainable Prosperity. Interested in a non-profit that is already doing some great things in that area? Visit GreenWave‘s website and get involved!

** I must make clear that, although Trump’s infrastructure plan might very loosely look like a Job Guarantee program because of its intent, it differs significantly from it because of how it will will be implemented. The president elect’s plan is based on private spending and making concessions to big corporations; it is basically a big giveaway to developers and not a program to ensure full-employment and financial stability.

Using Minsky to Better Understand Economic Development – Part 2

The work of Hyman Minsky highlighted the essential role of finance in the capital development of an economy. The greater a nation’s reliance on debt relative to internal funds, the more “fragile” the economy becomes. The first part of this post used these insights to uncover the weaknesses of today’s global economy. This part will discuss an alternative international structure that could address these issues.

Minsky defines our current economic system as “money manager capitalism,” a structure composed of huge pools of highly leveraged private debt. He explains that this system originated in the US following the end of Bretton Woods, and has since been expanded with the help of financial innovations and a series of economic and institutional reforms. Observing how this system gave rise to fragile economies, Minsky looked to the work of John Maynard Keynes as a start point for an alternative.

In the original discussions of the post-war Bretton Woods, Keynes proposed the creation of a stable financial system in which credits and debits between countries would clear off through an international clearing union (see Keynes’s collected writings, 1980).

This idea can be put in reasonably simple terms: countries would hold accounts in an International Clearing Union (ICU) that works like a “bank.” These accounts are denominated in a notional unit of account to which nation’s own currencies have a previously agreed to an exchange rate. The notional unit of account – Keynes called it the bancor – then serves to clear the trade imbalances between member countries. Nations would have a yearly adjusted quota of credits and debts that could be accumulated based on previous results of their trade balance. If this quota is surpassed, an “incentive” – e.g. taxes or interest charges – is applied. If the imbalances are more than a defined amount of the quota, further adjustments might be required, such as exchange, fiscal, and monetary policies.

The most interesting feature of this plan is the symmetric adjustment to both debtors and creditors. Instead of having the burden being placed only on the weakest party, surplus countries would also have to adapt their economies to meet the balance requirement. That means they would have to increase the monetary and fiscal stimulus to their domestic economies in order to raise the demand for foreign goods. Unlike a pro-cyclical contractionist policy forced onto debtor countries, the ICU system would act counter-cyclically by stimulating demand.

Because the bancor cannot be exchanged or accumulated, it would operate without a freely convertible international standard (which today is the dollar). This way, the system’s deflationary bias would be mitigated. Developing countries would no longer accumulate foreign reserves to counter potential balance-of-payment crises. Capital flows would also be controlled since no speculation or flow to finance excessive deficits would be required. Current accounts would be balanced by increasing trade rather than capital flows. Moreover, the ICU would be able to act as an international lender of last resort, providing liquidity in times of stress by crediting countries’ accounts.

Such a system would support international trade and domestic demand, countercyclical policies, and financial stability. It would pave the way not only for development in emerging economies (who would completely free their domestic policies from the boom-bust cycle of capital flows) but also for job creation in the developed world. Instead of curbing fiscal expansion and foreign trade, it would stimulate them – as it is much needed to take the world economy off the current low growth trap.

It should be noted that a balanced current account is not well suited for two common development strategies. The first is import substitution industrialization, which involves running a current account deficit. The second is export-led development, which involves a current account surplus. However, the ICU removes much of the need for such approaches to development. Since all payments would be expressed in the nation’s own currency, every country, regardless it’s size or economic power, would have the necessary policy space to fully mobilize its domestic resources while sustaining its hedge profile and monetary sovereignty.

Minsky showed that capable international institutions are crucial to creating the conditions for capital development. Thus far, our international institutions have failed in this respect, and we are due for a reform.

Undeniably, some measures towards a structural change have already been taken in the past decade. The IMF, for example, now has less power over emerging economies than before. But this is not sufficient, and it is up to the emerging economies to push for more. Unfortunately, the ICU system requires an international cooperation of a level that will be hard to accomplish. Aiming for a second-best solution is tempting. But let’s keep in mind that Brexit and Trump were improbable too. So why not consider that the next unlikely thing could be a positive one?

Using Minsky to Better Understand Economic Development – Part 1

The global system has seen two major shocks in 2016: the Brexit vote and Trump. What these events have in common is their populist rhetoric that promised to bring back jobs. These elections have tapped into growing anxiety over job security, which has not been addressed by most governments and has given room for demagogues to tap into the anger of the people. They reflect a problem that transcends the boundaries of any single nation: the global economy has been in a slump for almost a decade. Governments need to create jobs, and public fiscal stimulus is the way to do so. To allow it, we must rethink that system.

To understand why we have to consider the international system in which nation states currently operate in. Its current characteristics present challenges for developed and developing economies alike. There are two important features to consider: first, the system creates a deflationary bias by requiring recessionary adjustments and hoarding of the international mean of payment (i.e. dollars). Second, it lacks mechanisms to offset the chronic surpluses and deficits between nations, thus breeding financial instability. In a nutshell, it leads to poor creation and distribution of demand that is managed through capital flows. Instead of propping up demand, the global economic system props up debt.

This post will be split into two parts. This first part will employ the theories of Hyman Minsky to explain the features of our current global economy. Next week, we will follow up to discuss an alternative system that would allow for a better distribution of demand among countries and would support emerging economies’ development by freeing them from the swings of international markets.

In his Financial Instability Hypothesis, Minsky addresses the ability of a company to honor its debt commitments. Companies can finance investment through previously retained earnings (internal funds) and/or by borrowing (external funds). If retained earnings prove to be insufficient, and the company comes more and more reliant on borrowed funds, the company’s balance sheet structure shifts from being stable to unstable. As presented in a previous post on this blog, Minsky described this process as moving from a stable “hedge” profile to a riskier “speculative” profile, and finally to a dangerous “Ponzi” profile.

Similarly, a country has three ways in which it can meet its debt commitments denominated in foreign currency: i) by obtaining foreign exchange through current account surpluses; ii) by using the stock of international reserves (obtained through previous current account surpluses); and iii) by obtaining access to foreign savings, i.e. borrowing. The first characterizes a hedge financial profile in which the cash inflows are sufficient to pay the foreign currency denominated liabilities. Any mismatch between inflows and outflows can be covered by reserves (its cushion of safety) or by borrowing; while the former can still characterize a hedge profile – as long as the cushion of safety is big enough to cover the shortfall for the necessary period of time – the latter is said to be speculative. In other words, the country borrows to cover a mismatch with the expectation that future revenues will be used to meet those debt obligations.

A situation in which further rounds of borrowing are necessary to meet those commitments is by definition a Ponzi scheme. It can only be sustained over time if it manages to keep fooling investors to continue to lend. Once a greater fool is not found and financial flows are reversed, the economy collapses in a Fisher-type debt deflation: as assets are liquidated to meet those financial obligations, their prices fall and the debt burden becomes increasingly heavier. The case of a country is different from a company, where outflows are often accurately expected, and it commonly leads to massive capital flight, currency devaluation, fall in public bond prices and increase in its premiums (i.e. interest rate payments). This last point illustrates the implications of accumulating foreign liabilities – reserves included – and implies the growth of negative net financial flows from borrowers to creditors through debt servicing. In general, from developing to developed countries.

The adjustment process punishes the borrower much harder than the lender. Greece presents a clear example. For the borrowing country, the standard imposed remedy is austerity: curtail of imports and public expenditure in order to forcefully meet those debts. Or, more often, to stir up enough confidence and access additional financial resources from private investors; in other words, continuing the Ponzi financing. Even in a case where interest payments on the borrowed funds are lower than the rate of capital inflow, the stock of debt would still expand, increasing financial fragility. A development strategy dependable on increasing usage of foreign savings is thus not feasible.

Of course, economic development is an extremely broad subject and we sure don’t want to commit the mistake of suggesting a “one-size-fits-it-all” policy a la neoliberal disciples. Nonetheless, a common issue for many developing economies is the lack of complexity and variety of its production structure – heavily dependent on primary goods – and the low price-elasticity of demand for its exports, which means that shifts in prices (exchange rate) do not do much to stimulate exports (increasing demand). As such, price adjustments might not always work as expected. This is one of the rationales behind the familiar “import substitution industrialization” strategy that tragically seems to have become the case for the UK and US.

These common characteristics affect the ability of emerging economies to face both up- and downswings of the international economy with countercyclical policies. While international liquidity is abundant in booming periods, it becomes extremely scarce during the slumps. Both capital floods and flights can be domestically disruptive for a developing economy, affecting its employment and output level, solvency, and – ultimately, its sovereign power. With scarce demand and international liquidity, the indebted economy falls into the debt-deflation spiral: it has to incur in a recession big enough to collapse imports at a faster rate than exports thus generating surpluses to clear off debt.

It should be clear that besides being completely inefficient – as opposed to the argument commonly used by “free-the-capital” defenders – the current economic system does little to stimulate demand. It is quite the contrary. Notwithstanding, after almost 10 years after the financial crisis, the world economy is still suffering the consequences of economic “freedom,” and the fighting tool has focused excessively on monetary rather than fiscal policy. Instead of cooperation, we are prone to have currency wars, protectionism, “beggar-thy-neighbor” policies and chronic debt accumulation.

These points of criticism are not novel, but they do deserve more of our attention. The same applies to their solutions, which are the focus of Part 2 of this article.

The Brazilian Burden

On August 29th Dilma Rousseff, the democratically elected Brazilian ex-president, defended herself at the Senate against accusations of fiscal fraud, the so called “pedaladas fiscais.” Despite her defense, two days later, the president was formally impeached, putting an end to a process that has been carried on since May, when she first left office to face trial. The crime accusations were mainly accompanied by harsh criticisms of how the Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT) fiscal irresponsibility led to the poor economic condition that the country finds itself. Among the economic meltdown and several scandals of corruption, her approval rate and the popularity of her party collapsed in recent years. After 13 years of the leftist PT administration, the presidency is now occupied by the then vice-president Michel Temer, member of the centrist Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro, PMDB), a party also involved in corruption scandals, and whose popularity is as bad as his predecessor.

Political matters “apart,” the Brazilian economic situation is indeed dire. GDP is expected to contract 3.18% in 2016, a second year of contraction, following the 3.85% in 2015. Unemployment increased more than four percentage points from the beginning of last year, reaching 11.3% in June 2016. Despite the poor economic performance, inflation is still above the 6.5% target roof, being expected to accumulate 7.4% this year. The inflationary pressure comes mainly as an effect of the rapid exchange rate nominal devaluation of almost 54% within the years of 2015 and 2016, reaching now R$ 3.29 per dollar. As an attempt to control inflation and attract foreign capital, the Brazilian Central Bank – going in the opposite direction of the major Central Banks – sharply rose the short-term interest rate (Selic), sustaining it at 14.25% (!!!) since mid-2015. This also had a feedback effect on the government’s total deficit. (*)

Two questions remain open: what are the real roots of the economic crisis and will the new administration be able to tackle it? To understand the roots of the bust, it might be easier to refer to the very causes of the boom that preceded it.

The boom and bust

From 2002 to 2008, the Brazilian economy performed really well, growing at an average of 4% per year. This was possible mainly by a combination of policies aimed to reduce poverty and income inequality along with the positive international scenario.

Increasing worker’s real wages and government cash transfers to poor households – channeled mainly through social security and the famous Bolsa Família – established a virtuous cycle of increasing private consumption. Another important factor was the promotion of policies towards labor-market formalization, which guaranteed not only access to social security but also the availability of poor households to private lines of credit. Note, however, that not only poor households benefited from “cash transfers”: the historically high short-term interest rate guaranteed that rich households too enjoyed the fruits of the boom. The government managed to attend then both extremes of the income distribution.

International conditions also played a major role in boosting the domestic economy. High international liquidity and the commodity-price super cycle guaranteed appreciation of the exchange rate, which beyond positively impacting domestic real wages, also helped to keep inflationary pressures under control by making foreign goods more accessible.

The Brazilian economy suffered its first hit with the 2008 financial crisis. Despite the GDP growth of 7.5% already in 2010, the fast economic recovery was mainly a result of aggressive counter-cyclical expansionary policies by the government, who acted through state-controlled enterprises (as the oil and energy companies, Petrobras and Eletrobras) and programs of investment in economic and social infrastructure. From 2011 on, GDP returned to low levels, making it necessary for the government to adopt a new set of policies that can be summarized in tax exemptions and subsidized credit expansion to private companies from public banks. As it happens, this attempt to increase private investment had the only effect of deteriorating the public fiscal situation.

The budget, the budget!!!

The change in orientation of government policies – from an expansion of public investment in 2008-10 to a provision of fiscal stimulus to private companies in 2012-14 – happened at the same time as the commodity boom ended. Already in 2011, commodity prices stagnated and, along with Brazilian terms of trade, started its downward path in 2014. The end of the commodity cycle had a harsh impact not only in economy’s aggregate demand but also on the fiscal budget.

Before we get to the fiscal issue though, please, don’t get me wrong. The cause of the Brazilian economic crisis is less a result of the end of the commodity boom in itself than by the productive structure that such cycle reinforced. Brazil’s external sector is highly dependent on the exports of primary goods, and this dependence only deepened in the past decade. In 2015, roughly 50% of Brazilian total exports were composed by primary products, a number that increased 4.5% per year since 2002, when it accounted for less than 30%. If we include natural resource-based manufactures on the calculus, it reaches nearly 70% of total exports! Furthermore, while labor productivity increased 5.3% per year from 2000 to 2013 in the agriculture sector, it decreased 0.6% per year in the manufacturing industry.

No wonder when commodity prices reverted trend the economy took a strong hit. Instead of setting the ground for the eventual bust, Brazil placed all its coins on booming commodities. Despite all the public investment programs and fiscal exonerations to the private sector, the PT administration did not manage to increase investment as share of GDP, which remained stagnant around the 18% level throughout 2002-2015 – with public investment accounting for less than 3% of GDP. Lack of investment in infrastructure and manufacturing industry perpetuated an anemic economy with low productivity and dependent on economic cycles.

Public consumption and investment decreased even further after 2014 when the rapid deterioration of the fiscal budget turned the 3%-of-GDP government fiscal surpluses to almost 3%-of-GDP deficits. It is interesting to notice that the decreasing surpluses started in 2011, not accidentally when commodity prices stagnated. We can look at the three institutional balances for the Brazilian economy, representing the government, private, and foreign sectors, as follows below in order to see these trends more clearly.

We already know from previous posts on this blog (see here and here) that the government sector has a “crowding-in” effect on the private sector, meaning that government expenditure will, by an account identity, revert in private sector savings. Of course, in an open economy, this is only true as long as we assume the foreign sector to remain “stable”. Both the private and government sectors can only simultaneously run a surplus if the foreign sector generates a surplus that is big enough to account for both. (The intention of the figure presented is not to show that the balances sum to zero – which could be demonstrated by inverting the sign of the private sector and using a bar graph – but to show the movements of the financial assets and liabilities between the three sectors).

In the case of the Brazilian economy, the improvement of the foreign sector in 2001 allowed an increase in the private sector savings and a decrease in government total deficits. Once the financial crisis struck at the end of 2007, despite the counter-cyclical policies, the deterioration of the current account was mainly absorbed by a decrease in savings of the private sector, with government persisting to run primary surpluses and to sustain its total deficit level – even decreasing it until late 2012. On that year, we observe a sharp deleveraging of the private sector which, given the steady trend of the current account, was completely mirrored by the public sector.

Once again, the mistake – to name one – of the PT administration is that instead of increasing fiscal stimulus through direct government expenditure and investment in infrastructure it bet on providing credit and fiscal exonerations to the private sector as an attempt to increase private investment. In a scenario in which – to use Minsky’s terminology – the demand price of capital decreases at a faster rate than the supply price of capital, investment will not take place. In other words, despite the stimuli reducing the cost of new investment, expectations of profits were falling at a faster rate. In a situation of lack of aggregate demand, the government has to directly spend in order to create the necessary stimulus to the private sector through the generation of profits. Its avoidance led to the deterioration of the fiscal budget through the revenue side, surpassing now 10% of GDP, a result of the economic meltdown.

Instead of stimulating the economic activity by driving aggregate demand and adjusting the economy by sustaining the levels of output and employment, the government opted, mainly after 2014, for a “building confidence” strategy in which it compromises to reducing inflation, generating primary surpluses by increasing interest rates, and cutting government deficits, an adjustment that comes, in such case, through deepening the economic recession. All of it with the intention to attract market’s attention and foreign capital inflows. It, in fact, has a huge potential to generate financial fragility – but this is subject for another post.

And what now?

To address the second question posed at the beginning of this text, it is hard to believe that the new administration will be able to revert the dire scenario. It is still unsure if Temer will have the political leverage to pass important fiscal structural reforms in Congress, such as pension reform. Temer’s pledge to sharply reduce the government deficit can be summarized in the attempt to pass a law that will impose a limit to government expenditure indexed to the inflation level of the previous year. Besides reducing the ability of the government to invest, it also means cutting spending on areas such as education and public health, thus reducing the welfare state that was established in the previous decade, a major element in the virtuous cycle.

Whether or not promising to reduce inflation and the public deficit will be miraculously enough to stimulate agents confidence in the future, it will for sure hurt the economy and lead to a further decrease in demand price of investment in the short-run. In a situation of deleveraging private sector and slow global trade, it is unlikely that private investment will rise anytime soon. Until then, workers will be the ones to suffer from the increasing unemployment levels. The interest rate, beyond undermining any conceivable investment effort that could come from private agents, also carries a feedback effect to government budget and a distributive matter, as mentioned in the beginning of this text. When the pressure to cut government spending increases, “attend both extremes of the income distribution” becomes a hard job. We already know which side was chosen. Unfortunately, very often the adjustment burden comes from the weaker side.

(*) All the data presented in the text are extracted from the Brazilian Central Bank (BCB) and the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE).

How the Government Deficit Helps the Economy

When we talk about the government deficit, it’s often in the context of bad news. Whether it’s the cover of Time magazine, appointing us each a strangely precise debt of $42,998.12, or the US Debt Clock webpage, which portrays the debt as some sort of apocalypse countdown, we are meant to fear our government’s excessive spending. Standard economics warns against high deficits out of fear that government spending will “crowd out” private investment. This assumes that, when facing a limited money supply, the government will use up all the savings in the economy, in turn reducing private investment and raising interest rates. Clearly, this is not the case, as interest rates have been extremely low in the US despite our deficit.

Let’s look at deficit spending from an accounting perspective, where we divide the economy into three main sectors: the government, the private sector, and the foreign sector. The private sector includes all private entities (households and companies), and the foreign sector represents trade. This approach was pioneered by Wynne Godley and a detailed technical explanation can be found in this paper. In a given time, the amount of money spent and received by these sectors must add up to zero. In other words, a surplus of money in one sector always corresponds to a deficit in another. There can’t be one without the other. Here’s how this manifests in the United States: In a given year, the government spends X amount of money, and receives Y amount back in taxes. If the government spent more than it received, it means the private sector, along with the foreign sector, received more than they spent. Thus, the deficit of the government reflects forms the surplus of foreign and the private sector. In order to look at the foreign sector, we use the inverse of the capital account, which illustrates the trade surplus of the US. By using its inverse we are looking at the surplus of foreign countries against the US.

Applying this approach to the US, we can use the data from the US Financial Accounts to compile the following graph:

This graph illustrates the perfect mirror image between the government’s financial balance, the private sector balance, and the inverse of the capital account (because we are looking at the surplus of the rest of the world).

The mirror image from the graph clearly illustrates how the government deficit is reflected into a private sector surplus. If the government is spending more than it is taxing, it is stimulating the economy, not taking away from it.

The History of Money: Not What You Think

Most of us have an idea of how money came to be. It goes something like this: People wanted to exchange goods for other goods, but it was difficult to coordinate. So they started exchanging goods for money, and money for goods. This tells us that money is a medium of exchange. It’s a nice and simple story. The problem is that it may not be true. We may be understanding money entirely wrong. Continue reading “The History of Money: Not What You Think”